USA v. Cory Foster by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-30-2018 
USA v. Cory Foster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Cory Foster" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 404. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/404 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3650 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 CORY D. FOSTER, 
           Appellant 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-4225 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v.  
 
LAWRENCE PAYTON, 
        Appellant  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Nos. 1-15-cr-00021-01 and 02) 
District Judge:  Hon. Richard G. Andrews 
2 
 
_______________ 
 
ARGUED 
March 13, 2018 
 
Before:   JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Filed: May 30, 2018) 
_______________ 
Douglas L. Dolfman 
1617 John F. Kennedy Blvd. – Ste. 1660 
Philadelphia, PA   19103 
 
Lisa B. Freeland 
Renee D. Pietropaolo   [ARGUED] 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
1001 Liberty Avenue 
1500 Liberty Center 
Pittsburgh, PA   15222  
          Counsel for Appellant Cory D. Foster 
 
Edson A. Bostic 
Tieffa N. Harper 
Eleni Kousoulis   [ARGUED] 
Office of Federal Public Defender 
800 King Street – Ste. 200 
Wilmington, DE   19801 
          Counsel for Appellant Lawrence Payton 
 
David C. Weiss 
Robert F. Kravetz 
Edmond Falgowski 
3 
 
Elizabeth L. Van Pelt   [ARGUED] 
Office of the United States Attorney 
1007 N. Orange Street – Ste. 700 
P.O. Box 2046 
Wilmington, DE   19899 
          Counsel for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this consolidated appeal, Cory Foster and Lawrence 
Payton raise a number of issues arising out of their 
prosecution for being felons in possession of firearms.  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm the convictions and 
sentences. 
 
I. Background 
 
A. Facts Relevant to Both Foster and Payton1 
 
The events leading to prosecution began on 
February 5, 2015, when Joseph Turchen, an employee of a 
barbershop in the Branmar Plaza shopping center in 
Wilmington, Delaware, observed what he perceived as 
troubling behavior by occupants of a silver Honda Accord in 
                                              
 1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts contained in this 
subsection derive from trial evidence and testimony that was 
consistent with the evidence and testimony offered by the 
government at a pre-trial suppression hearing. 
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the shopping center parking lot. Turchen watched the 
Accord’s two occupants for approximately twenty minutes.  
He testified that the man in the passenger seat had a full beard 
and wore a hoodie, skull cap, and dark glasses and that the 
man in the driver’s seat was wearing a hoodie and a red or 
pink scarf over his face the whole twenty minutes he was 
sitting in the car.  Turchen found the occupants’ behavior 
suspicious because they were repeatedly looking around the 
strip of stores in Branmar Plaza, including the barbershop, a 
bank, and a jewelry store, and because he thought one of the 
occupant’s movements indicated “he was pumping himself up 
to do something.”  (App. at 547.)  Turchen also testified that 
the car’s occupants were “dressed like they was going to go 
do something.”  (App. at 543.)  He could not identify the car’s 
occupants; he could only tell that they were two black males, 
one with lighter skin.  His suspicions resulted in another 
barbershop employee calling 911 to report the suspicious 
behavior.   
 
When Delaware State Troopers arrived, Turchen saw 
the Accord’s occupants look towards the police cars, which 
were at the opposite side of the parking lot.  The Accord then 
promptly left the lot.  Before the car pulled away, the 
barbershop’s owner, Joseph Strano, got into his truck, 
followed the Accord, and took a picture of it and its license 
plate.  He provided that picture to Trooper Natalie George, 
one of the troopers who had responded to the 911 call.   
 
Trooper George ran the Accord’s license plate number 
through a police database and discovered that the car had 
been reported stolen in an armed robbery.  She then sent an e-
mail to other troopers alerting them of that fact and attaching 
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the picture of the Accord, which revealed a distinct bumper 
sticker on the rear of the car.2   
 
Trooper William Yeldell was one of the police officers 
who received George’s e-mail.  He patrolled the area around 
Branmar Plaza on a daily basis and the e-mail prompted him 
to pay particular attention to Branmar Plaza the following 
morning, February 6, to see if the Accord would return.  It 
did, and he got a clear look at its occupants, but only when he 
passed right in front of it, dressed in full uniform in an 
unmarked police car.  At that point, he made direct eye 
contact with those individuals.  He saw that the one in the 
passenger seat was wearing glasses, a red or pink scarf, and a 
white button-up shirt, and that the one in the driver’s seat was 
a black male with facial hair and a black jacket over a purple 
shirt.  At trial, Yeldell identified the man in the passenger seat 
as Foster and the man in the driver’s seat as Payton.   
 
After passing in front of the Accord, Yeldell 
communicated with other state troopers over the radio that he 
would need assistance making a vehicle stop.  He left the 
parking lot to meet with the troopers responding to his radio 
call and to put himself in a better position to make a safe stop.  
In doing so, he lost sight of the Accord for less than a minute.  
                                              
 2  George’s e-mail, and the fact that she ran the 
Accord’s license plate through a police database to discover 
its stolen status, were only introduced during a pre-trial 
suppression hearing.  Trial testimony established that other 
state troopers received an e-mail from George that contained 
a picture of the Accord and, in summary, relayed that it was a 
stolen car.   
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When the troopers returned to the parking lot, Yeldell noticed 
one of the men he had seen was now standing outside of the 
Accord.  The second man was no longer in or near the car.     
 
B. Foster-Specific Facts3 
 
Yeldell knew, with what he described as 100% 
certainty, that the man outside of the car was the same one he 
had observed in the Accord’s passenger seat.  He testified that 
he recognized the white button-up shirt and the “light red or 
pink colored scarf.”  (App. at 621.)  That individual turned 
out to be Foster. 
 
After noticing that Foster was holding an object in his 
hand, Yeldell pulled out his gun and ordered him to the 
ground.  Foster ran instead.  He passed another trooper, who 
shot him with a Taser.  As he fell to the ground, “a hand gun 
went flying through the air.”  (App. at 623.)  The troopers 
attempted to subdue Foster, and, after a struggle, he was tased 
a second time.  The officers then placed him in handcuffs and 
recovered a loaded .380 caliber black Smith & Wesson semi-
automatic pistol.   
 
                                              
 3  Facts contained in this subsection derive from trial 
evidence and testimony. 
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Payton-Specific Facts4 
 
While Yeldell and other officers were detaining Foster, 
Trooper Daniel McColgan responded to a radio call regarding 
the Accord’s missing second occupant.  He began a search of 
the mixed commercial and residential area around Branmar 
Plaza to locate the suspect, reported only as a black male.  
McColgan had also received and read George’s e-mail from 
the previous day, which noted that two potentially “armed 
and dangerous” black men were observed in a stolen Honda 
Accord at Branmar Plaza.  (App. at 301.) 
 
 At around 10 o’clock in the morning, and within 
approximately six minutes of receiving the alert about the 
missing suspect, McColgan saw a black man, later identified 
as Payton, walking along a road from the direction of 
Branmar Plaza and about two-tenths of a mile from the 
shopping center.  He observed Payton holding a soda and 
wearing a white skull cap, a dark jacket, and jeans.  Payton 
was walking “calmly down the street[.]”  (App. at 235.)  
McColgan, who was in an unmarked SUV but dressed in full 
uniform, drove by him and they “basically both nodded at 
each other.”  (App. at 208.)  The trooper did not stop because 
he wanted to “see what kind of reaction” he would get from 
Payton by driving by and did not want to approach a 
potentially armed suspect alone.  (App. at 209.)  He continued 
to monitor Payton for a little over four minutes.   As he 
did so, he radioed to ask if “anybody [had] a better 
description … to work with” because, at that time, he knew 
                                              
 4  Facts contained in this subsection derive from 
evidence and testimony proffered by the government during a 
pre-trial suppression hearing. 
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simply that he was looking for a black male who had fled on 
foot.  (App. at 210-11.)  Payton was the only pedestrian he 
had seen in the search area matching the generic description 
relayed over the radio.   
 
 McColgan testified that Payton was “just lackadaisical 
walking down the street” and that it didn’t “seem like he[] 
[was] going any place in particular.”  (App. at 214.)  He did 
not observe Payton approach any stores or any other people.  
Payton continued to walk beside the road at the same calm 
pace.  As McColgan watched Payton and maintained radio 
contact with other officers who had arrived to assist him, he 
told his fellow officers to continue searching the area “in case 
this person was not the person we believe was involved in 
this.”  (App. at 221.)  None of the officers, however, reported 
seeing any pedestrians matching the general description of the 
suspect.   
 
 Eventually, McColgan and his colleagues decided to 
stop Payton.  When they were in position to do so, McColgan 
used his loudspeaker to tell Payton to put his hands on his 
head.  Payton promptly complied.  The officers handcuffed 
Payton, patted him down, and placed him in the back of 
McColgan’s SUV.  Payton did not have any weapons with 
him.  McColgan questioned him and learned that Payton did 
not have identification, that he reported coming from the 
“market up the street,” and that he was from Philadelphia.  
(App. at 227-28.)  What little identifying information Payton 
chose to provide turned out to be false.   
 
McColgan had fourteen years of experience patrolling 
the area around Branmar Plaza.  He acknowledged that he 
was not familiar with all of the people who lived in that area 
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and that it was possible that Payton could have been a 
resident of one of the developments nearby.  McColgan 
explained, however, that it was rare for pedestrians to be 
walking on the side of the road where he saw Payton.  It was 
a 40 mile-per-hour road with no sidewalks at the location 
where Payton was stopped.  McColgan said that, in his 
experience, only two pedestrians walked with any frequency 
along that stretch – both white special needs adults.  He 
further testified that Payton was “new to the area” and 
seemed to have “no rhyme or reason [for] where he was 
going[.]”  (App. at 225.)  At the time McColgan stopped 
Payton, he did not have a specific physical description of the 
missing suspect or of the clothes the suspect was wearing.   
 
After placing Payton in the back of his SUV, 
McColgan drove him back to Branmar Plaza for 
identification.   
 
C. Search of the Accord5 
 
 Following Foster’s and Payton’s apprehension, the 
stolen Accord was transported to the state police’s “Evidence 
Detection Unit.”  (App. at 630.)  A search of the car revealed 
a loaded Hi-Point .9mm rifle, with a scope, inside a carrying 
case on the back seat, along with multiple rolls of duct tape, a 
pair of gloves, and a large drawstring bag.  Trial testimony 
later established that the Accord was stolen in December 
2014 and that it did not contain the rifle, rolls of duct tape, or 
                                              
5  The facts in this subsection are derived from trial 
testimony and trial evidence. 
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gloves when it was stolen.  No DNA or fingerprint evidence 
connected Foster or Payton to the items found in the car.   
 
D. Relevant Pre-Trial Evidentiary Rulings 
 
 The defendants filed several motions in limine, 
challenging the admissibility of certain evidence and 
testimony.6  Two pre-trial rulings in particular are relevant on 
appeal. 
 
 First, Payton sought to exclude evidence stemming 
from what he argues was his unconstitutional stop and 
detention.  He asserted that McColgan did not have 
reasonable suspicion to stop him when he was walking calmly 
down the road.  The government responded that the totality of 
the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion for the stop.  
The District Court concluded that McColgan had reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to stop Payton, and thus did not exclude 
any evidence on that ground.  The Court explained that the 
totality of the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion, 
despite the vague description of the missing suspect.  More 
specifically, the Court highlighted that McColgan knew that a 
potentially dangerous suspect had very recently fled on foot, 
that he saw Payton within a defined search area in which no 
other individuals matched the broad description of the 
suspect, that Payton was stopped in close geographic 
proximity to the last location the suspect was observed, and 
that McColgan knew from experience that it was unusual to 
                                              
 6  Although the parties filed numerous motions in 
limine, we discuss here only those motions and resulting 
rulings that are the subject of this appeal. 
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see an unknown pedestrian walking in the area where he 
spotted Payton.   
 
 Second, Foster and Payton both sought to exclude the 
barbershop employees’ testimony concerning the events of 
February 5, arguing that it was impermissible propensity 
evidence, not relevant to the jury’s consideration of the crime 
charged, and unduly prejudicial.  The government responded 
that the testimony constituted evidence of motive, properly 
admissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  The 
government argued that the testimony allowed it to “provide a 
motive for Defendants’ gun possession” by demonstrating 
that they were preparing to commit an armed robbery.  (App. 
at 34.)  The District Court agreed with the government and 
allowed the testimony to show motive.  The Court further 
reasoned that any prejudice to the defendants did not 
outweigh the testimony’s probative value, which was relevant 
to material facts (i.e., gun possession) that the government 
had to prove to obtain convictions on the crimes charged.  
The government was thus able to use the barbershop 
employees’ testimony at trial to support its theory of the case, 
arguing to the jury that the “case [was] about two days in a 
row, two men, two guns, and a plot to commit a robbery.”  
(App. at 505.) 
 
E. Convictions and Sentencing Enhancements 
 
 Foster and Payton proceeded to a jury trial and were 
each convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Payton challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction.  Both 
men challenge their resulting sentences. 
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Payton argues that the District Court erred by applying 
a four-level enhancement pursuant to United States 
Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).  That 
section provides for a sentencing enhancement when a 
defendant uses a firearm in relation to another felony offense.  
The enhancement was triggered by the District Court’s 
determination that Payton was involved in a conspiracy with 
Foster to commit robbery on the day he was arrested.  Payton 
timely objected, arguing that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient for the government to prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that he was involved in any such conspiracy.  
The Court rejected Payton’s argument and determined that 
the government had satisfactorily shown use of the firearm at 
issue “in connection with another felony offense, namely; 
conspiracy to commit a robbery[.]”  (App. at 1088.)  The 
Court explained, “I heard the evidence at trial.  I think there is 
no reasonable conclusion from the evidence other than the 
two defendants were casing the business in the Branmar 
Shopping Center with the intent to rob it.”  (App. at 1088.)  
Payton was sentenced to 37 months of incarceration.   
 
Foster contends that the District Court erred by 
applying the enhancement contained in U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(c)(1) to increase his advisory guidelines range from 
63-78 months to 210-262 months.  Section 2K2.1(c)(1) 
provides for a sentencing enhancement if a defendant used the 
same gun associated with the offense of conviction in 
connection with another offense.  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1).  
The District Court applied that enhancement because Foster’s 
Presentence Report (“PSR”) concluded that he had used the 
same pistol recovered during his Delaware arrest to commit a 
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string of robberies and a carjacking in Pennsylvania.7  Foster 
did not object to that enhancement during his sentencing 
proceedings, and he was sentenced to 120 months of 
incarceration, the statutory maximum.   
 
II. Discussion8 
  
 Five issues are presented on appeal.  First, Payton 
contends that the District Court erred by concluding that 
McColgan had reasonable suspicion to stop and question him.  
Second, both Foster and Payton challenge the Court’s 
evidentiary ruling allowing the government to introduce the 
barbershop employees’ testimony concerning the events of 
February 5.  Third, Payton argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to support his conviction for constructive possession 
of a firearm.  Fourth, Payton asserts that the District Court 
erred by applying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to enhance his 
sentence.  Finally, Foster argues that the District Court erred 
by applying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1) to enhance his sentence.  
None of those challenges warrants changing the results of the 
trial or sentencing proceedings. 
 
                                              
7  Foster was convicted of those crimes after a jury trial 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  He challenged his 
conviction in that case in a separate appeal.  See United States 
v. Foster, No. 17-1902 (3d Cir.). 
 
 8  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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A. There Was Reasonable Suspicion to Stop 
Payton.9 
 
Payton argues that the District Court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of 
McColgan’s detaining him.  He argues that McColgan did not 
have reasonable suspicion to stop him because the only 
identifying information available before the seizure was that a 
black male had fled the Branmar Plaza parking lot.  Although 
Payton is correct that that was the only identifying 
information, it was not the only relevant information known 
to McColgan at the time he made the stop.  We agree with the 
District Court that the totality of the circumstances known to 
McColgan, combined with his experience as a law 
enforcement officer, provided him with reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to stop Payton. 
 
A law enforcement officer “may constitutionally 
conduct a brief, investigatory stop and frisk … if he has a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot.”  United States v. Graves, 877 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 
2017) (quotation marks, editorial marks, and citation 
omitted).  Such a detention is often called a “Terry stop,” 
after the well-known Supreme Court decision in Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  Reasonable suspicion must exist at 
the time of a Terry stop.  United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 
                                              
 9  “We review the District Court’s order granting a 
motion to suppress for clear error with respect to the 
underlying factual findings, but we exercise plenary review 
over legal determinations.”  United States v. Mallory, 765 
F.3d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
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239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).  Information acquired after the initial 
seizure is not relevant to the reasonable suspicion analysis.  
United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 559 (3d Cir. 2006).  
To meet the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer needs 
only “a minimal level of objective justification[.]”  Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).  “The officer must be 
able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.”  Id. at 123-24 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  And even a 
stop “that is supported by reasonable suspicion … may 
nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if it is excessively 
intrusive in its scope or manner of execution.”  United States 
v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 451 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
We afford significant deference to a law enforcement 
officer’s determination of reasonable suspicion.  Police are 
allowed to utilize “their own experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them that might well 
elude an untrained person.”  Graves, 877 F.3d at 499 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[A] trained officer 
may find reasonable suspicion ‘based on acts capable of 
innocent explanation.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  “[W]e must 
consider the totality of the circumstances, including the police 
officer’s knowledge, experience, and common sense 
judgments about human behavior.”  United States v. 
Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 
Graves, 877 F.3d at 498 (emphasizing that courts must look 
to “the totality of the circumstances leading up to the moment 
of the defendant’s seizure” when assessing reasonable 
suspicion). 
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The facts relevant to our reasonable suspicion analysis 
are not in dispute.  On February 5, an e-mail was sent to 
Delaware State Troopers referencing two potentially “armed 
and dangerous” black men in a stolen Honda Accord at 
Branmar Plaza.  (App. at 301.)  The following morning, 
February 6, Yeldell observed two black men in the same car 
and at the same location.  When he and other troopers 
approached the car, there was only one man, Foster, next to it.  
After detaining Foster and discovering that he was armed, 
Yeldell radioed to other police officers that the second 
suspect was at large.  The radio message did not provide any 
precise description of the suspect, such as defining physical 
traits or clothing.  By way of physical description, the officers 
receiving the radio alert knew only that they were looking for 
a potentially armed black male leaving on foot from Branmar 
Plaza.     
 
Payton thus frames the issue at hand as a police officer 
pulling over the first black man he saw after hearing a report 
that a black suspect was at large.  If viewed in isolation, we 
agree that so general a description could not support 
reasonable suspicion.  Our case law is clear – “an excessively 
general description … in the absence of corroborating 
observations by the police[] does not constitute reasonable 
suspicion[.]”  Brown, 448 F.3d at 252; see also, e.g., United 
States v. Arthur, 764 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Let us be 
perfectly clear.  Ubiquitous or vague physical descriptions … 
, without more, are not enough to support reasonable 
suspicion.”); United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 349 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (“[G]eneric descriptions of race, gender, and build, 
without more, have been held insufficient to justify 
reasonable suspicion.”).  But we cannot and do not view that 
description in isolation.  We must view it in light of the 
17 
 
totality of the circumstances known to McColgan at the time 
he made the stop and with due deference to his fourteen years 
of experience patrolling the area surrounding Branmar Plaza. 
 
The totality of the circumstances here includes the 
following.  McColgan received the radio call from Branmar 
Plaza and quickly worked to coordinate a search perimeter 
with other law enforcement officers.  Within approximately 
six minutes of receiving the alert, he observed a black male, 
Payton, walking along a road and coming from the direction 
of Branmar Plaza.  Payton was walking calmly with a soda in 
his hand.  McColgan followed Payton for approximately four 
minutes and observed him walk a short distance beyond the 
commercial establishments towards a stretch of road with 
only residences.  At the time McColgan made the Terry stop, 
no law enforcement officer had observed any other 
pedestrians in the defined search area matching the suspect’s 
description.  The suppression hearing established that 
McColgan was familiar with the area, that McColgan did not 
recognize Payton as being from the area, that it was rare for 
individuals to be walking along the stretch of road where 
Payton was walking, that it was a relatively high-speed road 
with no sidewalk at that point, and that the two people 
McColgan did see from time to time walking along that 
stretch of road were two white adults with special needs.   
 
“[R]elevant circumstances” like those known to 
McColgan can overcome a “vague and imprecise 
description[.]”  Goodrich, 450 F.3d at 553.  We have 
previously identified a non-exclusive set of four factors that 
may cumulatively overcome a “general or indefinite 
description,” namely, “(1) the reputation of the area [where] 
the stop occurred …; (2) the time of day [the suspect was 
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stopped]; (3) the geographical and temporal proximity of the 
stop to the scene of the alleged crime; and (4) the number of 
persons in the area.”  Id. at 560-61.  Those points “must be 
considered alongside any other relevant factors[.]”  Id. at 561.  
The prior experience of the officer conducting the stop can 
serve to strengthen or weaken the weight afforded to any 
particular factor or factors. 
 
A mid-morning stop in a residential area with no 
reported reputation for criminal activity can weigh against a 
reasonable suspicion determination.  See id. (explaining that 
constitutional concerns arise when “the police perform a 
Terry stop in an otherwise tranquil neighborhood during the 
daylight hours based only on a general description”).  But we 
do not ignore context.  McColgan knew that a potentially 
armed suspect had just fled from a nearby stolen vehicle.  The 
trooper observed Payton within a defined search area set up to 
locate the missing suspect.  He saw Payton very soon after the 
suspect was reported missing and within two-tenths of a mile 
of the stolen car.  After locating Payton within close 
geographic and temporal proximity of the last sighting of the 
suspect, McColgan confirmed with other officers that no 
other pedestrian matching the description, generic as it was, 
had been observed in the search area.   
 
On top of the facts he learned that day, McColgan’s 
fourteen years of experience patrolling the area around 
Branmar Plaza must be accounted for when weighing whether 
it was reasonable for him to view Payton’s presence as 
suspicious.  Deference is owed McColgan’s knowledge that it 
was rare to see anybody other than two white special needs 
adults walking along the stretch of road where Payton was 
stopped.  Although an untrained person not familiar with the 
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area might have viewed Payton’s behavior as unremarkable, 
McColgan’s experience gave him reason to think otherwise.  
When he ultimately stopped Payton, he was acting on more 
than an inchoate hunch of criminal activity premised on an 
individual matching a generic description. 
 
The geographic and temporal proximity of Payton to 
the stolen car and the lack of any other suspect matching the 
general description of the suspect, along with McColgan’s 
long experience and familiarity with the area, combine to 
show there was indeed constitutionally sufficient, reasonable, 
and articulable suspicion to stop Payton, even if the stop did 
occur mid-morning in a relatively crime-free area.  Cf. United 
States v. Quinn, 812 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We have 
held that generic suspect descriptions and crime-scene 
proximity can warrant reasonable suspicion where there are 
few or no other potential suspects in the area who match the 
description.”); Arthur, 764 F.3d at 98 (explaining that a law 
enforcement officer was entitled to rely on generic 
descriptions of two suspects “in combination with other 
clues” such as “the suspects’ close proximity to the crime 
scene, the direction in which the men were headed, and the 
dearth of others in the critical … area”).10 
                                              
 10  Payton argues that our decision in United States v. 
Brown, 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006), compels us to conclude 
otherwise.  We disagree.  Brown involved an unreliable 
location tip and a generic description of two suspects, which 
led a police officer to stop two black males simply because 
they were the only two black males at the given location.  Id. 
at 241-43, 248-51.  Because of those factors, we held that the 
generic descriptions provided to the police did not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 252.  In short, the totality of the 
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Payton further argues, however, that his Terry stop 
was not reasonable as conducted because he was handcuffed 
and transported back to Branmar Plaza for identification 
purposes.  A Terry stop must be “minimally intrusive” and 
tailored by police to “diligently pursue[] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly[.]”  United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 
685-86 (1985) (citation omitted).  The reasonableness of a 
Terry stop’s scope is case-specific and, again, judged by the 
totality of the circumstances.  Johnson, 592 F.3d at 452.  
Although Payton claims that the officers made “no attempt to 
investigate or use less intrusive means to determine if Mr. 
Payton was involved in the Branmar Plaza incident” (Payton 
Opening Br. at 47), he has suggested no alternative means the 
officers could have used and cites no legal authority 
supporting his position that the officers’ actions were 
unreasonable under the circumstances. 
 
Here, the officers conducting the Terry stop had 
received an alert that a potentially armed suspect was 
missing.  Placing Payton in handcuffs while confirming that 
he was not armed and dangerous was not outside the scope of 
a reasonable Terry stop.  See Johnson, 592 F.3d at 448 
(explaining that “placing a suspect in handcuffs while 
securing a location or conducting an investigation [does not] 
automatically transform an otherwise-valid Terry stop” into 
an unreasonable Terry stop).  Nor was it unreasonable to 
transport Payton the very short distance back to Branmar 
Plaza.  See United States v. McCargo, 464 F.3d 192, 198 (2d 
                                                                                                     
circumstances in Brown was insufficient to overcome the 
generic description of the suspects.  That is not the case here. 
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Cir. 2006) (“[I]n some circumstances, police may transport a 
suspect short distances in aid of a Terry stop.”).  Yeldell was 
still there and it was appropriate to bring Payton to him since 
that was the course of action most “likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly[.]”  Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.  Thus, 
McColgan and his colleagues acted within the scope of a 
proper Terry stop. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s denial 
of Payton’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result 
of the Terry stop. 
 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion When It Permitted the 
Barbershop Employees’ Testimony Pursuant 
to Rule 404(b).11 
 The District Court allowed the government to 
introduce the barbershop employees’ testimony regarding 
                                              
 11  We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for 
an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 
240 (3d Cir. 2017).  “An abuse of discretion occurs only 
where the district court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
clearly unreasonable—in short, where no reasonable person 
would adopt the district court’s view.”  United States v. 
Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  We exercise plenary review over a 
district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which includes “whether evidence falls within the 
scope of Rule 404(b).”  United States v. Steiner, 847 F.3d 
103, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 
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their observations on February 5 of the men in the Honda 
Accord, over Foster’s and Payton’s objections that the 
testimony was speculative, not relevant to the events of 
February 6, and unduly prejudicial.  We discern no error in 
that decision.  
 
Rule 404(b) precludes a party from introducing 
“[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act … to prove a 
person’s character,” but permits the introduction of such 
evidence if it is used “for another purpose, such as proving 
motive[.]”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  We have been clear that 
“Rule 404(b) is a rule of general exclusion, and carries with it 
no presumption of admissibility.”  United States v. Caldwell, 
760 F.3d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  It “must be applied with careful precision, 
and … evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is not to be 
admitted unless both the proponent and the District Court 
plainly identify a proper, non-propensity purpose for its 
admission.”  Id. at 274. 
 
The proponent of Rule 404(b) evidence carries the 
burden to meet a four-step test: “(1) the other-acts evidence 
must be proffered for a non-propensity purpose; (2) that 
evidence must be relevant to the identified non-propensity 
purpose; (3) its probative value must not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential for causing unfair prejudice to the 
defendant; and (4) if requested, the other-acts evidence must 
be accompanied by a limiting instruction.”  United States v. 
Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 241 (3d Cir. 2017).  Foster and Payton 
declined a limiting instruction on the basis that no such 
instruction could “be crafted that would not tend to 
legitimatize the fact that there may have been a robbery 
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planned.”  (App. at 503.)  Accordingly, we address only the 
first three elements of Rule 404(b)’s admissibility test. 
 
1. Non-Propensity Purpose 
  
 Evidence of uncharged wrongful acts satisfies the non-
propensity step for Rule 404(b) admissibility when it is 
admitted for a purpose “that is ‘probative of a material issue 
other than character.’”  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 
250 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681, 686 (1988)).  Simply invoking a non-propensity 
purpose “does not magically transform inadmissible evidence 
into admissible evidence.”  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276 
(citation omitted).  Rather, the testimony concerning other 
acts must “materially advance the prosecution’s case.”  
United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 291 (3d Cir. 2014).  In 
determining whether it does so, “courts should consider the 
material issues and facts the government must prove to obtain 
a conviction.”  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 276 (quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
 
 The District Court ruled the barbershop employees’ 
testimony admissible primarily because the Court considered 
it as proper proof of motive under Rule 404(b).  It observed 
that “[n]umerous courts of appeals, including the Third 
Circuit, have concluded that Rule 404(b) other acts evidence 
is admissible to show motive in § 922(g)(1) cases[.]”  (App. 
at 36); see United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 187 n.19 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (explaining in a felon-in-possession case that “it is 
highly relevant to show that a defendant had a motivation to 
commit the crime for which he is being charged”).  In 
particular, it explained that allowing the testimony advanced 
the government’s case because it supported the government’s 
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“‘casing businesses’ motive, which in turn [made] it more 
likely that [Foster and Payton] each possessed a firearm on 
February 6, 2015.”  (App. at 36); see also Brown, 765 F.3d at 
291-92 (explaining that the government must prove that “the 
defendant knowingly possessed the firearm” to obtain a 
conviction under § 922(g)(1)). 
 While they obviously deny any illicit motive, neither 
Foster nor Payton suggests that the District Court erred in 
determining that motive was a proper non-propensity purpose 
for admitting testimony under Rule 404(b), and we too are 
persuaded that the government satisfied the first element of 
Rule 404(b)’s admissibility test. 
 
2. Relevance 
 
 In addition to identifying a proper purpose, the 
proponent of Rule 404(b) testimony must establish the 
relevance of the evidence to that purpose.  Brown, 765 F.3d at 
292.  That requires the proponent to demonstrate how the 
proffered evidence fits into a logical chain of inferences, no 
link “of which is the inference that the defendant has a 
propensity to commit [the] crime.”  United States v. Steiner, 
847 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).  The 
proponent must also show that the proffered evidence would 
allow a “jury [to] reasonably conclude that the [prior] act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor.”  Huddleston, 
485 U.S. at 689.  In determining whether a jury could 
reasonably reach such a conclusion, we “examine[] all the 
evidence in the case” because “[i]ndividual pieces of 
evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in 
cumulation prove it.”  Id. at 690-91.  At bottom, “[r]elevance 
is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at 
issue which must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences 
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that make a material fact more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence.”  United States v. Sampson, 
980 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
 Foster and Payton argue that the barbershop 
employees’ testimony was not relevant because it was purely 
speculative, failed to identify either Foster or Payton as being 
present in the Accord on February 5, and required the jury to 
make an impermissible inference that “suspicious” black 
males have the propensity to possess firearms.  They 
presented similar arguments to the jury, contending that the 
testimony concerning February 5, which did not identify 
either defendant, had no relevance to the events of February 6 
and should be afforded no weight.  That perfectly legitimate 
litigation strategy does not, however, dictate whether 
evidence meets Rule 404(b)’s relevancy requirement.  Id.  
That determination is made by assessing whether, viewed in 
the context of all the evidence in the case, the Rule 404(b) 
evidence made a material fact more or less probable. 
 
 Here, the District Court’s ruling laid out the logical 
chain of inferences explaining why the barbershop 
employees’ testimony made it more probable that Foster and 
Payton each possessed a gun on February 6.  As the Court 
explained, testimony concerning the events of February 5, 
viewed with other evidence in the case, showed that (i) two 
black males in a silver Honda Accord were “scoping out” 
Branmar Plaza on February 5; (ii) the suspicious activity 
prompted barbershop employees to photograph the car and its 
license plate and to contact police; (iii) police discovered that 
the Accord had been stolen; (iv) Trooper Yeldell later 
observed the same stolen Accord in the same parking lot 
“with two black male occupants who appeared to be 
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feverishly looking about the shopping center”; (v) law 
enforcement then found Foster outside of the Accord with a 
gun on his person; and (vi) a search of the Accord revealed an 
additional firearm on the back seat. (App. at 35-36 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).)  No step in that chain of 
inferences required an impermissible inference about the 
defendants’ propensity to possess firearms.  Rather, it helped 
establish the defendants’ motive for possessing firearms on 
February 6.  Moreover, evidence at trial established that 
Yeldell identified Payton as the driver of the stolen Accord on 
February 6, Foster as the passenger, and that items commonly 
used when committing a robbery were found in the car.   
 
 One can imagine a scenario in which two men show up 
in a small shopping plaza parking lot in a stolen car and case 
the stores in a way that arouses suspicion, and then, one day 
later, two different men do the exact same thing at the same 
place in the same car.  That is a stretch, but imaginable.  Yet 
the totality of the evidence was certainly sufficient to allow a 
jury to reasonably conclude that Foster and Payton were the 
individuals in the Accord on February 5, and hence the 
barbershop employees’ testimony had relevance to motive.  
There was no error in the District Court’s conclusion that the 
government met the second element of Rule 404(b)’s 
admissibility test. 
 
3. Undue Prejudice 
 
 Rule 404(b) evidence must also meet Rule 403’s 
balancing test.  Steiner, 847 F.3d at 111.  Rule 403 instructs 
courts to exclude evidence “if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury[.]”  Fed. R. 
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Evid. 403.  “[W]hen evidence is highly probative, even a 
large risk of unfair prejudice may be tolerable.”  United States 
v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 119 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  We afford significant deference to a 
trial court’s Rule 403 evidentiary rulings, United States v. 
Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2013), and we agree with 
the District Court here that the prejudicial effect of the 
barbershop employees’ testimony on Foster or Payton did not 
substantially outweigh its probative value. 
 
 The testimony in question was significant as to both 
Foster and Payton because it supported the government’s 
theory that the defendants had a motive to possess firearms on 
February 6.  At trial, Foster contested the government’s 
assertion that he had actual possession of a gun on 
February 6.  He said that law enforcement officers falsely 
testified that a gun flew out of his hand, and that the police 
had planted the gun at the scene.  Given that defense, the 
government was entitled to rebut Foster’s argument by 
presenting evidence of his motive for possessing a gun that 
day.  See Lee, 612 F.3d at 187 n.19 (“In a case like this, 
where [the defendant] is asserting that he never had a gun on 
the day in question, it is important to know that he had a 
personal motivation to possess a gun.”). 
 
 The government’s constructive possession case against 
Payton, meanwhile, required it to prove that he had 
knowledge of the rifle found on the back seat of the Accord.  
Brown, 765 F.3d at 292.  We have recognized that 
“[e]vidence of knowledge … is critical in constructive 
possession cases[.]”  Id. (some alterations in original).  The 
government’s use of the barbershop employees’ testimony to 
demonstrate that Payton was motivated to possess a gun on 
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February 6, and therefore had knowledge of its existence on 
the back seat of the car he was seen driving, was key to the 
government’s constructive possession case against Payton.  
Cf. Lee, 612 F.3d at 186-87 (explaining that knowledge was 
not a critical part of a case against the defendant because the 
trial was not about whether the defendant “knew that he had a 
rifle in the back seat of his [car]”). 
 
 Foster argues that the barbershop employees’ 
testimony, and the government’s reliance on that testimony 
throughout the trial, could have misled the jury into 
convicting the defendants for conspiring to commit robbery, 
when they were only charged with unlawful possession of a 
firearm.  We do not share that concern.  The verdict sheet 
explicitly referenced the charged offenses – unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a felon  – and the District Court, 
referencing that form, instructed the jury to convict if they 
found “that the government ha[d] proved either of the 
defendants guilty on [that] charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt[.]”12  (App. at 938.)  That instruction was clear, and we 
presume it was followed.  Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 
200, 211 (1987); United States v. Hodge, 870 F.3d 184, 205 
(3d Cir. 2017).  The District Court thus did not err in its 
conclusion that the government met the third element of Rule 
404(b)’s admissibility test. 
 
 In sum, the Court made a reasonable determination to 
admit the barbershop employees’ testimony because that 
                                              
 12  The Court’s instructions and verdict sheet made 
clear that the jury was to consider the evidence as to each 
defendant individually.   
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evidence was introduced to prove motive, was relevant, was 
highly probative, and was not unduly prejudicial. 
 
C. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s 
Verdict Against Payton.13 
 
 The government presented sufficient evidence during 
the trial for a rational jury to convict Payton of constructive 
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1).  Payton’s argument that the government relied on 
nothing but his proximity to the rifle found on the Accord’s 
back seat to prove constructive possession ignores 
circumstantial evidence connecting him to the rifle.   
 
Section 922(g)(1) required the government to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that “(1) [Payton] ha[d] been 
convicted of a crime of imprisonment for a term in excess of 
one year; (2) [Payton] knowingly possessed the firearm; and 
(3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.”  United 
States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012).  Payton 
stipulated to the first and third elements, so the only element 
at issue was whether he knowingly possessed the gun found 
                                              
13  When reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
challenge to a jury verdict, “[w]e review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the government.  We do not reweigh 
the evidence or assess witness credibility.”  Hodge, 870 F.3d 
at 204 (citation omitted).  Our sole task is to determine 
“whether the jury’s verdict is permissible.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Our governing standard is “whether ‘a rational trier 
of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the verdict is supported by substantial 
evidence.’”  Id. (brackets and citation omitted). 
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in the Accord.  Because he was not found in actual possession 
of a firearm, the government’s case against him proceeded on 
a constructive possession theory.  See Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 
278 (explaining that the government can prove a § 922(g)(1) 
conviction in two ways: actual possession or constructive 
possession).  “Constructive possession may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence.”  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 
150, 156 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
To establish that Payton had constructive possession of 
the rifle, the government had to demonstrate that he knew of 
the rifle and that “he exercised dominion or control over the” 
Accord’s back seat.  Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 278; see also 
United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“Constructive possession exists if an individual knowingly 
has both the power and the intention at a given time to 
exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or 
through another person or persons.” (quotation marks and 
citation omitted)).  Factors we have considered when 
determining whether the government has proven dominion or 
control include “evidence that the defendant attempted to hide 
or to destroy the contraband, … that the defendant lied to 
police about his identity,” and the defendant’s proximity to 
the prohibited item.  United States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 
818 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see also United States 
v. Walker, 545 F.3d 1081, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Proximity 
to a weapon, coupled with some other factor such as 
connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying 
control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating 
involvement in an enterprise may suffice to show dominion 
and control over a weapon.” (quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).  Constructive possession cannot be proven by 
proximity alone; there must be “other proof” linking the 
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defendant to the prohibited item.  Jenkins, 90 F.3d at 820; 
accord United States v. Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371, 376-77 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
 
Contrary to Payton’s argument, the evidence before 
the jury sufficiently established the “other proof” necessary to 
show dominion or control.  A barbershop employee observed 
two suspicious black males in a silver Honda Accord on 
February 5, whom he perceived to be “up to no good.”  (App. 
at 544-45.)  The following morning, on February 6, Yeldell 
observed Payton in the driver’s seat of that same car in the 
Branmar Plaza parking lot, a car that police by then knew was 
stolen.  A subsequent search of the car revealed a gun case 
containing a rifle in plain view on the back seat.  The search 
also revealed rolls of duct tape, gloves, and a drawstring bag.  
After Payton saw police arrive at Branmar Plaza, he fled the 
scene, and after he was stopped, he provided false 
identification information to the police.     
 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, 
that evidence demonstrated more than just Payton’s proximity 
to the rifle.  The government set forth a plausible motive for 
Payton to possess the gun – armed robbery – that was 
supported by the items recovered from the Accord.  The 
evidence also established Payton’s evasive conduct, and 
Yeldell’s testimony that he saw Payton in the driver’s seat of 
the Accord further supported a finding that Payton exercised 
dominion or control over the interior of the Accord, see 
Walker, 545 F.3d at 1088 (stating that drivers are “held to a 
higher level of accountability for” contraband found in a car) 
(citation omitted). 
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 Accordingly, we will not disturb the jury verdict 
convicting Payton of unlawful possession of a firearm. 
 
D. Payton’s Sentence Was Properly Enhanced 
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).14 
   Payton argues that the District Court erred in 
applying the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement after it concluded 
that he used a firearm in connection with another felony 
offense.  He contends that the evidence presented during trial 
and at sentencing was insufficient to show he was involved in 
an offense separate from his gun possession conviction 
because the barbershop employees’ testimony did not identify 
him as being present on February 5.  The District Court saw it 
differently, and so do we. 
 
 At this point, we are not dealing with a “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard.  “The government bears the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
sentencing enhancement applies,” United States v. Napolitan, 
762 F.3d 297, 309 (3d Cir. 2014), and the evidence used at 
sentencing is “subject to a due process standard of 
reliability.”  United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1547 
(3d Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 
136, 141 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that the government can 
only meet its “burden by presenting reliable and specific 
evidence” (citation omitted)).   
                                              
14  “[W]e review the District Court’s interpretation of 
the Sentencing Guidelines de novo,” “findings of fact for 
clear error[,]” and “application of the [g]uidelines to facts for 
abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 
555 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
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 Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides, in relevant part, for 
an enhancement “[i]f the defendant … used or possessed any 
firearm … in connection with another felony offense[.]”  
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).  A sentencing court can apply the 
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement only if it determines that a 
defendant “[u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition in 
connection with another felony offense.”  United States v. 
Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2014) (alteration in 
original).  In making that determination, courts can consider 
relevant and reliable “information without regard to its 
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial[.]”  
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3.  The District Court applied that 
enhancement after finding that Payton was conspiring with 
Foster to rob a store in Branmar Plaza on the morning of 
February 6, the day of his arrest.   For purposes of the 
enhancement, the Court did not “think it matter[ed] whether 
[Payton] was present” on February 5 (App. at 1083), because 
it determined that the totality of the circumstances led to “no 
reasonable conclusion … other than the two defendants were 
casing the business in the Branmar Shopping Center with the 
intent to rob it,” (App. at 1088).  Moreover, the evidence 
established by a preponderance that his co-conspirator, 
Foster, was present on both February 5 and February 6 to case 
stores in Branmar Plaza.  In addition, the Court referred to 
video surveillance evidence not admitted at trial, but that was 
properly considered at sentencing, that Foster was also at 
Branmar Plaza on January 19 casing businesses.  Then, on 
February 6, Payton and Foster were sitting in a stolen car in 
the same shopping center parking lot, with “no apparent 
reason” for being there and with “almost nothing with them 
other than useful tools for a robbery, including the two loaded 
weapons, the backpack along with the two rolls of duct tape, 
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[and] the gloves[.]”  (App. at 1089.)  And, as the Court 
highlighted, Payton fled the scene on February 6 after 
“realiz[ing] the police were there.”  (App. at 1089.) 
 
 Payton has not pointed to anything in the record 
disputing the accuracy of the findings described above or to 
any evidence leaving us “with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States 
v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).  
We therefore conclude that the District Court’s factual 
findings were not clearly erroneous and there was no error 
when it applied § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to enhance Payton’s 
sentence. 
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E. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err 
When It Enhanced Foster’s Sentence 
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1).15 
Similarly, the District Court did not commit plain error 
when it enhanced Foster’s sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(c)(1).  That guideline provides, in relevant part, for 
an enhancement “[i]f the defendant used or possessed any 
firearm … cited in the offense of conviction in connection 
with the commission or attempted commission of another 
offense[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1).  Section 2K2.1(c)(1) was 
amended in 2014 to limit its application only to instances in 
which the defendant used the exact same firearm “cited in the 
offense of conviction” in connection with another offense.  
U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 784, Reason for 
Amendment. 
 
                                              
 15  We apply plain error review to Foster’s appeal of 
the § 2K2.1(c)(1) enhancement because he did not preserve 
his objection below.  Under plain error review, an appellate 
court can correct an error not raised at trial where (1) the 
district court erred; (2) the error was clear or obvious; and 
(3) the “error ‘affected the appellant’s substantial rights,’” 
which typically means that there is a reasonable probability 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.  United 
States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).  If those 
three conditions are met, we then have discretion to remedy 
the error, and we exercise this discretion “only if the error 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 
(alteration omitted)). 
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Foster contends that the government did not meet its 
burden to introduce reliable evidence sufficient to support the 
§ 2K2.1(c)(1) enhancement.  It is well established, though, 
“that a sentencing court may rely on the facts set forth in the 
presentence report when their accuracy is not challenged by 
the defendant.”  United States v. Watkins, 54 F.3d 163, 166-
67 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A) (“At 
sentencing, the court … may accept any undisputed portion of 
the presentence report as a finding of fact[.]”). 
 
Foster argues that the District Court erred when it 
applied the § 2K2.1(c)(1) enhancement because it relied “on 
an unsupported and unsupportable assertion in the [PSR].”  
(Foster Opening Br. at 13.)  His argument depends primarily 
on a line of cases from the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit holding that “[b]ald, conclusionary 
statements do not acquire the patina of reliability by mere 
inclusion in the PSR.”  United States v. Elwood, 999 F.2d 
814, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1993).16  That authority is 
                                              
 16  See also United States v. Zuniga, 720 F.3d 587, 591 
(5th Cir. 2013) (“If the factual recitation [in the PSR] lacks 
sufficient indicia of reliability, then it is error for the district 
court to consider it at sentencing—regardless of whether the 
defendant objects or offers rebuttal evidence.” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)); United States v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 
721, 724 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The PSR … cannot just include 
statements, in the hope of converting such statements into 
reliable evidence, without providing any information for the 
basis of the statements.” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Shacklett, 921 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that 
a probation officer’s unsupported assertion in a PSR as to 
drug quantity amount had “no indicia of reliability,” 
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distinguishable, however, because each of those cases 
involved either a defendant who had objected to factual 
assertions contained in the relevant PSR or a PSR containing 
unsupported factual assertions.  The Fifth Circuit has itself 
stressed that, “[g]enerally, a PSR bears sufficient indicia of 
reliability to permit the district court to rely on it at 
sentencing. …  [T]he defendant has the burden to show that 
the information relied on in a PSR is inaccurate.”  United 
States v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal 
citation omitted).  Unlike the cases Foster cites, Foster did not 
object to the factual statements contained in the relevant 
PSRs, and the record contains sufficient evidence to support 
the District Court’s determination – by a preponderance of the 
evidence – that the gun recovered during Foster’s arrest in 
Delaware was the same gun used during robberies and a 
carjacking he committed in Pennsylvania. 
 
 The PSR stated that the Smith & Wesson .380 caliber 
semi-automatic pistol gun seized at Branmar Plaza was the 
same gun as the one Foster used during those earlier crimes.  
Foster did not object to that conclusion during his sentencing 
proceedings but on appeal characterizes it as unsupportable.  
He argues that the PSR in this case relied on the PSR 
prepared in connection with his Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania convictions and that that underlying PSR only 
identifies the gun used in Pennsylvania as being consistent 
with, rather than the same as, the one recovered in Delaware.  
Although Foster is correct on that point, the conclusion that 
the Smith & Wesson recovered in Delaware was the same 
                                                                                                     
especially since the defendant objected to the PSR’s drug 
quantity conclusion). 
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gun used in the Pennsylvania crimes is supported by at least 
three categories of direct and circumstantial evidence. 
 
First, a relatively short time separated the crimes 
Foster committed in Pennsylvania, which took place in 
November and December 2014, from his Delaware arrest in 
February 2015.  It is not unreasonable to conclude that Foster 
used the same gun over that time period and kept it in his 
possession to perpetrate future crimes.  Second, there is 
surveillance video from each of the Pennsylvania robberies 
that allows the conclusion that the gun used in those crimes 
and the gun recovered in Delaware are the same.  Third, 
although the victims of the robberies could not identify with 
certainty that the gun recovered in Delaware – and later 
shown to each of them during the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania trial – was the same gun they were confronted 
with when robbed, they each agreed that the gun looked 
similar.17  Those facts, coupled with Foster’s failure to object 
                                              
17  Victim Kumar testified that he could not be sure 
that it was the same gun, but that “it looks like to me it’s the 
same gun.  But I can’t tell you for 100 percent because I was 
so scared that day.”  (App. at 1025.)  Victim Kabatt testified 
that, although he agreed the guns were “similar,” he could not 
know for sure because he was scared and the perpetrator’s 
hands obscured his view of the gun.  (App. at 1028.)  Victim 
Singh testified that the gun “could be [the same] because it’s 
kind of [the] same size,” but that he was not sure because the 
robbery had taken place a year-and-a-half prior and he had 
not thought “about that incident again since then.”  (App. at 
1034.)  Victim Borkowski testified that the gun looked 
“similar in size and color,” (App. at 1038,) but he could not 
say for certain that it was the same gun. 
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to the PSR during his sentencing proceedings before the 
District Court, lead us to conclude that the District Court did 
not plainly err by applying § 2K2.1(c)(1) to enhance Foster’s 
sentence. 
 
III. Conclusion 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Foster’s and 
Payton’s convictions and sentences. 
 
